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THE URANIUM DEBATE:
What the Fox 
Report Really Said
Dr. J. Camilleri
The First Report issued by the Ranger 
Uranium Environmental Inquiry headed by 
Mr Justice R.W. Fox has given anything but 
the green light to the mining and export of 
uranium. Indeed, far from encouraging any 
“ go-ahead", as mining interests and some of 
the less reputable media would have us 
believe, the Fox Report has properly 
concentrated on “ the hazards, dangers and 
problem s o f and associated  w ith the 
production o f nuclear energy” . While the 
Commission's recommendations lack the 
clarity and vigor that one' would have 
desired, there is no disputing the fact that the 
Commission has accepted the main thrust of 
the evidence submitted to it by the opponents 
o f nuclear power. The Commission thus 
concludes:
"Policy respecting Australian uranium 
exports, for the time being at least, 
should be based on a full recognition of 
the hazards, dangers and problems of 
and associated with the production of 
nuclear energy, and should therefore 
seek to limit or restrict expansion o f that 
production.”  (p. 185.)
Having come to such a far-reaching 
conclusion about one o f the most crucial
questions o f  our tim e, it is perhaps 
disappointing that this otherwise valuable 
report should nevertheless contain a number 
o f ambiguities and inconsistencies. This 
limitation, however, is acknowledged in the 
Report itself and attributed, at least by 
implication, to the “ somewhat different 
views” held by each Commissioner (p.175). 
No doubt, it is this appreciation o f  the 
importance o f value judgments which led the 
Commission as a whole to the conclusion 
that -
"Ultimately, when the matters o f fact 
are resolved, many of the questions 
which arise are social and ethical ones” 
(p .(•>.)
From this premise it follows naturally that -
“ .... the final decisions should rest with 
the ordinary man and not be regarded as 
the preserve of any group o f scientists or 
experts, however distinguished.” (p.6.)
RISKS IN FUEE  
( Y( l,K O P ER AT IO N S
Precisely because the Fox Report gives so 
little encouragement to mining and export of
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uranium, the pro-nuclear lobby has been 
forced to rest its case almost entirely on 
points 1 and 2 o f the summary o f findings 
and recommendations (pp.185-6). However, 
on close scrutiny it is clear that these two 
conclusions, relating to the hazards o f 
mining and milling uranium on the one hand 
and the operations o f nuclear reactors on the 
other, do not constitute a recommendation in 
favor o f the mining and export o f uranium. 
The Commission has merely arguecTthat 
these two risks do not, in its view, provide a 
compelling reason for banning the mining 
and export o f uranium. Many would question 
the validity o f this conclusion, but all that it 
entails is simply the notion that, if the 
Commissioners were satisfied on all other 
counts, they would not feel justified on these 
two grounds alone in recommending against 
uranium mining and exports. As it happens, 
the three Commissioners make it clear that 
they are far from satisfied that the many 
other risks, dangers and costs associated 
w ith nuclear power can be easily  or 
effectively overcome. In any case, the Report 
insists on “close regulation and constant 
surveillance” (p.177) and admits that such 
controls are likely to be adequate only in 
relation to “ the hazards involved in the 
ordinary operations o f nuclear power 
reactors” (p. 185). Presumably an altogether 
different and unacceptable set o f  hazards 
could arise in the event of technical or human 
failure, war, an act o f deliberate sabotage (p. 
95), or earthquakes and other geological 
disturbances (p.97).
R A D I O A C T I V E  WASTES
The Report readily admits that the 
disposal o f low-level and intermediate-level 
wastes could pose a serious problem in the 
future “ if supervision were relaxed, or if  the 
operation became too widespread, or the bulk 
too great” (p.177). As for high-level wastes, 
the Commission concludes:
“ There is at present no generally 
accepted means by which high-level 
waste can be permanently isolated from 
the environment and remain safe for 
very long periods .... Permanent disposal 
o f high-level solid wastes in stable 
geological formations is regarded as the 
most likely solution, but is yet to be 
demonstrated as feasible. It is not 
certain that such methods and disposal
sites will entirely prevent radioactive 
releases following disturbances by 
natural processes or human activity.” 
(p.110.)
This assessment o f likely risks leads the 
Commission to quote and endorse the 
findings of the British Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution chaired by Sir 
Brian Flowers:
“ There should be no commitment to a 
large program of nuclear fission power 
until it has been demonstrated beyond 
reasonable doubt that a method exists to 
ensure the safe containment o f long- 
lived, highly radio-active waste for the 
indefinite future.”  (p.187.)
The creation of large amounts o f long-lived 
radioactivity is described as a problem of 
“ first-rate international importance” which 
demands “ careful watching” and “ regular 
and  fre q u e n t r e a s s e s s m e n t ” . The 
Commission makes it clear that, unless 
s a t is fa c t o r y  d is p o s a l  m e th o d s  are 
established in the very near future, it will not 
be possible to justify supplies o f uranium by 
Australia, (p.178.)
N U C L E A R  THEFT  
A N D  SA B O TAG E
The Commission regards the possibility of 
theft and illicit use o f nuclear materials and 
the sabotage o f nuclear facilities as one o f the 
most serious dangers surrounding the 
nuclear industry. It does not believe that 
nuclear insta llation s can  currently 
withstand determined assaults by terrorist 
organisations, or that it will be possible in 
the future “ to provide sufficient defences to 
render every installation safe against attack 
by even small numbers o f well-armed, 
trained men” , (p. 152) In the light o f evidence 
submitted to it, the Commission accepts the 
view that -
“  .... a terrorist group could use reactor 
grade plutonium to make a bomb with 
good prospects o f  giving a yield of 
several hundred tonnes o f  TNT .... An 
explosive yield o f a few hundred tonnes 
o f TNT might be sufficient to destroy a 
very large skyscraper with severe loss of 
life. The ionising radiation released and 
the subsequent fall-out would also kill 
and injure many people.” (p.154.)
On the question of safeguards against such
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risks, the Commission acknowledges:
“ While provision o f security adequate to 
guarantee against terrorist intrusion is 
theoretically possible .... there must be a 
question whether adequate precautions 
will in fact be taken.”  (p. 178.)
The Fox Report also raises the serious 
possibility that powdered plutonium might 
be d e lib e r a te ly  d is p e rs e d  in to  the 
atmosphere (p. 155). Such a probability would 
o f course grow proportionately with the 
projected increase in the am ount o f 
plutonium circulating around the world.
The unique potential o f plutonium for 
threat and blackmail against society leads 
the com m ission  to the obviou s but 
frightening conclusion:
“ There is a very real risk that the 
opportunity and the motive for nuclear 
blackmail will develop with time. Some 
common characteristics o f terrorist 
groups suggest that they might attempt 
to make and explode atomic bombs or 
make other terroristic uses o f nuclear 
m aterials or fa c ilities  .... M ajor 
difficulties could arise in attempting to 
determine the reality o f a threat by a 
group to explode an atomic bomb, to 
spread radiation from a reactor, or to 
disperse plutonium. Either acceding to 
or refusing the demands o f such a group 
could have very adverse consequences 
for society.” (p.159.)
PROLIFERATION
In the view o f the Commission the most 
serious danger is undoubtedly that of 
proliferation o f nuclear weapons. In this 
regard, the inadequacy o f  the safeguards 
provided by the N on-^oliferation Treaty
(N P T ) are re a d ily  r e c o g n is e d . T h e  
Commission argues, in fact, that both the 
NPT and the International Atomic Energy 
A gen cy  (IA E A ) h ave con trad ictory  
objectives in so far as they seek to promote 
the peaceful uses o f atomic energy while at 
the same time attempting to restrict its war- 
making potential. India’s detonation o f  a 
nuclear explosive in May 1974 is cited as an 
illustration  o f  the m any d ifficu lties  
surrounding any attempt to implement a 
fully effective safeguards system* The 
Commission concludes that “ a commercial 
nuclear program, particularly if it can be 
d e s ig n e d  to in c lu d e  e n r ich m e n t  or 
reprocessing facilities, or both (on however 
small a scale), does offer a satisfactory ‘half­
way house’ to a military objective.” (p.127.) 
Hence the Commission’s blunt statement:
“ The nuclear pow er industry  is
unintentionally contributing to an
increased risk of nuclear war.” (p.185.)
The Fox Report leaves no doubt that, in its 
view, the existing NPT safeguards system is 
both weak and deficient. Not only has the 
Treaty not received universal adherence 
(p. 125), but many o f the non-signatories, 
notably China, France, Argentina, Brazil, 
India, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, South Africa, 
are either nuclear or near-nuclear countries 
(p. 197). The powerful commercial incentives 
which are encouraging the current spate o f 
agreements between the suppliers and the 
consumers o f nuclear technology are likely to 
erode further the viability of the NPT system 
(p p .125-6). A nother obvious w eakness 
recognised by the Commission is the 
possibility o f unilateral withdrawal from 
safeguards agreements:
“ The wide nature o f the discretion
available to each state that does wish to
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withdraw is evident .... Thus, even if 
in ternational safeguards were in 
themselves a totally adequate guarantee 
against diversion by governments, those 
safeguards are dependent upon treaty 
arrangements that can be terminated by 
unilateral act.” (p.128).
But, in actual fact, the existing safeguards 
are themselves far from adequate. Moreover, 
even if some of the difficulties could be 
overcom e by revised dra ftin g  o f  the 
agreements, the Report raises serious doubts 
as to whether Australia “ would be able to call 
upon sufficient personnel with the expertise 
to carry out” the functions required by back­
up arrangements (p.129). Similar doubts are 
expressed in relation to the degree o f pressure 
that Australia would realistically be able to 
exert on the importing state in order to 
ensure compliance with back-up safeguards 
requirements (p.130). Similarly at the 
international level, the C om m ission  
acknowledges the difficulties that are 
likely to arise from the growing financial 
burden o f safeguards (p. 135) as well as from 
the increasing demand for suitably trained 
personnel to carry out the necessary 
inspection duties (p. 136).
Regarding the complex task o f controlling 
the transfer of nuclear materials, the 
Commission explicitly states:
“ The NPT does not prohibit the further 
transfer of materials by a receiving state 
to a third state, and is not entirely 
satisfactory in the provision it makes for 
safeguards on such transfers.” (p.130.)
This and other limitations have spurred 
the great powers, and particularly the United 
States, to seek stricter controls on the 
international transfer o f nuclear technology 
and nuclear equipment. Thus far, these 
efforts have met with little success because 
they have been inevitably negated by 
narrow ly con ceived  com m ercia l and 
national interests.
Given the inescapable realities of national 
sovereignty and profit-oriented policies it is 
difficult to see how any improvements to 
existing safeguards arrangements can, in 
practice, mitigate, let alone eliminate, the 
fundamental weaknesses o f the NPT system. 
In this regard it is worth quoting the 
c o m p r e h e n s iv e  su m m a ry  o f  th ese  
weaknesses provided by the Report itself,
which include -
“  .... the failure of many states to become 
parties to the NPT; the inability of 
safeguards to prevent the transfer of 
nuclear technology from nuclear power 
production to the acquisition o f nuclear 
weapons competence; the fact that many 
nuclear facilities are covered by no 
safeguards; the existence o f a number of 
loopholes in safeguards agreements 
regarding their application to peaceful 
nuclear exp losion s, to m aterials 
intended for non-explosive military uses, 
and to the retransfer o f materials to a 
third state; the absence, in practice, of 
safeguards for source materials; the 
practical problems o f maintaining 
effective checks on nuclear inventories; 
the ease with which states can withdraw 
from the NPT and from most non-NPT 
safeguards agreements; deficiencies in 
accounting and warning procedures; 
and the absence o f reliable sanctions to 
d eter d iv e r s io n  o f  s a fe g u a rd e d  
material.” (p.147.)
Little wonder that the Commission is 
forced to the conclusion that “ these defects, 
taken together, are so serious that existing 
safeguards may provide only an illusion of 
protection” (p.147). Itis, therefore, somewhat 
surprising to find the C om m ission  
recommending that, in the event of Australia 
deciding to sell its uranium, such exports 
“ should be subject to the fullest and most 
effective safeguards agreements, and be 
supported by fully adequate back-up 
agreements to the entire civil nuclear 
industry in the country supplied" (p. 185). In 
so doing, the Report is merely advocating the 
very course o f action on which it has itself 
cast the most serious doubts on the grounds 
o f techn ica l, politica l and econom ic 
impracticality. One can only assume that, in 
referring this critical question back to 
Parliament, the Commission’s intention is to 
leave it to the Australian people and to their 
elected representatives to determine whether 
or not Australia can effectively apply and 
enforce the stringent safeguards which are 
necessary but on which the international 
community has so far failed to agree.
W ID ER SOCIAL C O N S E Q U E N C E S  
OF N U C L E A R  POWER
Although one o f the most disappointing 
aspects o f the Report is its treatment o f the
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social consequences o f a plutonium economy, 
it is worth noting that the Commission was 
sufficiently concerned with the issue to 
regard it as an important reason for reducing 
the growth in energy consumption (p.35). 
Significantly, the Commission received no 
evidence contrary to that submitted by the 
critics of nuclear power who argued that 
increasing dependence on electricity  
distributed through a centralised grid 
“ would require administration by a remote 
and bureaucratic technical elite, lead to a 
great con cen tra tion  o f  politica l and 
economic power, and be vulnerable to large 
and expensive technical mistakes and 
failures” (p.35).
While no effort was made to assess the 
argum ent that “ the large sca le and 
complexity o f nuclear power will reduce the 
opportunity for greater public control o f 
decision -m aking and m ay threaten 
democratic procedures and civil liberties” , 
the Commission agreed that many countries 
will be forced to take account o f these 
considerations in their energy policies. 
Presum ably the socia l and econom ic 
implications o f nuclear power will need to be 
an integral part of the Australian uranium 
debate.
ECONOMIC C O N S ID E R A T IO N S
If the pro-nuclear lobby was hoping that 
the weakness o f its case on the wide range of 
safety questions would be partly offset by 
acceptance o f the claims regarding the 
economic advantages o f uranium mining 
and exports, then it must be terribly 
disconcerted by the findings of the Ranger 
Inquiry.
In the first place, the Commission has 
firmly rejected the argument that the 
industrialised Western world is currently 
facing or is likely to face in the foreseeable 
future a severe energy shortage. On the 
contrary, the Report explicitly states:
“  .... while the economies o f countries 
heavily dependent on imported oil have 
been adversely affected by increase in 
world oil prices, it is incorrect to say  that 
there is a presently existing world 
e n e rg y  c r is is  w h ich  w ill  crea te  
disastrous economic effects .... and it is 
clear that it is incorrect to suggest that 
there are energy impoverished nations
which need Australian uranium for 
survival.”  (p.164.) - [Italics added]
In this regard, the Report makes the 
pertinent point that “ total world coal 
resources are so large that they will not be 
approaching depletion for many decades, 
even if the rate o f energy use continues to 
increase exponentially as it has this 
century” (p. 164).
The only major immediate world problem 
in the energy field  identified  by the 
Commission is the availability o f liquid 
fuels. If this is an accurate assessment of 
current energy needs, then it is difficult to 
disagree with the Commission’s view that 
Australia’s uranium can do little to 
improve the situation (p.164). The Report 
indicates that, without the use o f fast breeder 
reactors reserves o f uranium would amount 
to only about 5 per cent o f presently 
estimated fossil fuels (p.39). It is precisely for 
this reason that the three Commissioners 
have argued that the m ost va luable 
contribution that Australia could make 
would be to concentrate on such alternatives 
as the production of liquid fuels from coal 
and the provision o f coal at economic prices 
as a replacement for oil. In the longer term, 
the Commission advocates the development 
o f technology to utilise solar energy with a 
view both to low and intermediate grade heat 
applications as well as electricity generation.
In addition to its stress on the need for the 
rapid development o f alternative energy 
resources other than nuclear power, the 
Commission repeatedly emphasises the 
value and the feasib ility  o f  energy 
conservation. It notes that “ the major energy 
consuming nations have embarked on 
energy conservation programs o f varying 
intensity, and that they are being given high 
priority” (p.34). Extrapolating from present 
trends, the Report predicts that energy 
conservation “ will have a significant effect 
on total energy consumption by the end of 
the century” (p.35). Believing that “ societies 
may come to value more highly in the future 
th ings not included in con v en tion a l 
measurements o f economic activity” (p.33) 
and that zero economic growth may become 
a socially feasible and desirable goal, the 
Commission advocates the introduction of 
additional policy measures “ to achieve 
desired reductions in the growth of energy 
consumption” (p.35) and makes one o f its
16 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW Nos. 55-56
principal recommendations a national 
program of energy conservation (p.186).
Another argument suitably squashed by 
the Report is the preposterous suggestion 
that nuclear energy is likely to solve the 
economic problems o f underdeveloped 
countries. According to IAEA projections, 
which have had to be revised downwards, by 
the year 2000 the Third World would still 
account for only 10 per cent o f world nuclear 
capacity (p.53). The obvious point to note 
about these countries is that large power 
generating units are not suited to their needs, 
and that the much smaller units required are 
generally uneconomic if based on nuclear 
power. Where nuclear energy grids exist they 
are more likely to supply electricity for the 
affluent minority in the cities than the rural 
masses. Accordingly, the Com mission’s 
m ain recom m endation  in relation  to 
underdeveloped countries is not for Australia 
to make available its uranium resources but 
rather to participate “ in international efforts 
to develop those forms o f solar energy 
technology most suited to the needs o f 
developing countries” (p.56).
Advocates of nuclear power often advance 
the alternative argument that its widespread 
use in the developed countries will indirectly 
help the develop ing  countries. The 
Commission has little confidence in the
discredited theories o f capitalist economic 
development from which this argument is 
derived: “ Nor does it appear that the further 
d e v e lo p m e n t o f  n u c le a r  p ow er in 
economically advanced countries will make 
any significant difference to the ability or 
willingness o f those countries to assist less 
affluent countries” , (p.56)
Regarding the future o f the nuclear 
industry in the advanced  industrial 
countries, the Report once again presents a 
much less optimistic picture than the pro- 
nuclear propaganda would suggest. Having 
noted the marked reduction in the number of 
new orders for nuclear power stations which 
occurred during 1974 and 1975, the 
Commission goes on to indicate the high 
p r o b a b il ity  o f  a re d u ce d  ra te  o f  
commissioning o f new stations during the 
next decade (p.45). Apart from the depressed 
demand for electricity since 1973, the Report 
explains this trend by reference to the large 
increases in the capital costs o f  building and 
commissioning nuclear stations in recent 
years (p.48). According to an OECD study, 
the total capital investment required for 
energy programs may thus be so high as to 
conflict with other economic objectives. In 
the view o f the Commission -
“ .... electricity authorities generally may
experience difficulties in raising finance
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for heavy capital expenditures in the 
decade ahead .... since nuclear plants are 
more capital-intensive than coal-fired 
plants, it seems probable that the 
relative cost position o f nuclear plants 
may be adversely affected by these 
financing difficulties.” (p.48.)
The Commission also questions the cost 
efficiency o f large nuclear stations and 
concludes that “ smaller-scale coal-fired 
generating plants may prove to be more 
economic than large coal-fired or nuclear 
generating units” (p.49).
Problems with other stages o f the nuclear 
fuel cycle are also contributing to doubts 
about the economic competitiveness o f 
nuclear generation o f electricity. Present 
enrichment costs are heavily subsidised by 
governments (all enrichment plants at 
present in commercial operation were built 
for military purposes - p. 27), and it is thought 
that the real cost o f enrichment is at least 
twice what is charged at present (p.50). A 
number of governments in Western Europe 
are financing the construction o f new 
enrichment plants (p.27), but efforts in the 
USA to induce private companies to put up 
the money have so far been unsuccessful 
(p.29) - hardly a vote o f  confidence in the 
nuclear industry by the huge transnational 
corporations involved . The status o f 
reprocessing o f spent fuel is even more 
uncertain. At present there are no plants in 
operation capable o f reprocessing oxide fuel 
(the type used in the great majority o f power 
reactors) and some severe techn ica l 
problems have been encountered (p.29). If 
and when these problems are overcome, it 
appears that reprocessing will not be a 
profitable operation by itself, which means 
that the cost o f nuclear electricity will be 
further increased (p.50).
As for the direct benefits that are likely to 
accrue to Australia for the sale of uranium, 
the report estimates that additions to 
national income generated by uranium 
exports would rise from less than 0.1 per cent 
o f projected national income in 1980-81 to 
about 0.5 per cent in 1990-91, and would fall 
to about 0.4 per cent by the end o f the century 
(p.79). In relation to foreign exchange 
earnings, it is estimated that uranium 
exports would grow to 5 per cent o f total 
earnings in 1991-92 but would subsequently 
decline to about 3.4 per cent at the end of the
century. In this context it is worth noting 
that the Commission rejects as too high the 
estimates o f potential Australian uranium 
sales presented to it by the Australian 
Uranium Producers Forum, the Australian 
A t o m ic  E n e r g y  C o m m is s io n  a n d  
Pancontinental Mining Ltd. (p.66). It should 
also be noted that these estimates o f the 
contribution to national income and export 
revenue are based on an assumed production 
and sale o f 30,000 tonnes o f uranium per 
year, which is 10 times the proposed initial 
Ranger production; it could only be attained 
if all the presently known uranium deposits 
were mined at full capacity, plus another two 
or three new d iscoveries the size o f  
Pancontinental’s Jabiluka. Thus it could be 
regarded as a rather optimistic projection. 
Even more sobering are the Inquiry’s 
find ings in relation  to the possib le  
contribution to employment. It is calculated 
that at an initial production rate o f 3,000 
tonnes o f U308 per year, the Ranger 
operations would employ about 600 during 
the construction period o f two years. 
Thereafter, the operation would employ 250 
people. Even if production were doubled, the 
impact on manpower requirements would be 
m in im a l, r e s u lt in g  in a d d it io n a l  
employment for 400 people in the first two 
years and 150 people thereafter (p.77). To the 
extent that the operation would draw largely 
on skilled or semi-skilled workers from the 
south, the mining o f uranium cannot be 
expected to have anything but the most 
negligible effect on the national or even local 
level of unemployment.
F U T U R E  AC T IO N
Given the magnitude o f the dangers and 
costs o f nuclear power and the extremely 
limited benefits that Australia or the 
international community are likely to derive 
from a policy o f uranium exports, it is hardly 
surprising that the First Ranger Report 
should have shown so little enthusiasm for 
the proposal. Not only does the Commission 
give no clear go-ahead for the mining and 
sale o f uranium, not only does it make any 
positive decision conditional on stringent 
controls and safeguards, but it goes to very 
considerable lengths to recommend specific 
courses o f action which, if  adopted, would 
obv iou sly  con flict  both lo g ica lly  and 
practically with any policy designed to assist 
the expansion o f nuclear production.
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On the question  o f  regu lation , the 
Commission stresses the need for strong 
central government control over all activities 
relating to the nuclear power industry. Such 
controls should be such as to ensure that the 
government can, at any time, immediately 
terminate those activities, permanently, 
indefinitely or for a specified period (psl85). 
Moreover, the Commission stresses that 
such controls may have to be applied 
irrespective o f the economic disadvantages 
for the mining interests. Should it be 
concluded that the government does not 
have the strength to resist these pressures, 
then the Commission believes that the only 
proper course would be to refrain from any 
mining development (p. 183). Other controls 
must fulfil the following objectives (pp. 182- 
3):
* careful selection o f the countries to be 
supplied regardless o f the international 
tensions that such discrimination might 
create
* maintenance o f production and price 
stability
* pressures from the mining industry must 
not be allowed to determine the course to 
be followed in relation to the hazards of 
nuclear power.
* adherence to all treaty obligations
* resale by a purchaser o f Australian 
yellowcake to take place with Australian 
approval
The government must be satisfied in 
advance that the conversion or enrichment 
o f Australian uranium will not create serious 
hazards
* the entire policy is to be subject to 
frequent Parliamentary decisions and 
consideration.
C o m p le m e n t in g  t h e s e  p r o p o s e d  
conditions, the Commission has outlined a 
positive program o f measures, the net effect 
o f which would be to prevent or seriously 
militate against uranium mining and 
exports. These include (pp.183-6):
* the estab lishm ent o f  a U ranium  
A d v is o r y  C o u n c il  to a s s is t  the 
government in relation to all the 
environmental aspects covered by the 
Report. The Council is to command 
p u b lic  c o n f id e n c e , to re p o r t  to 
Parliament, and the majority o f its
members are not to be involved in the 
nuclear industry or the promotion of 
nuclear power
* initiatives to ensure that the public is 
kept fully informed o f relevant facts, for 
w h ic h  p u r p o s e  i t  is  s t r o n g l y  
recommended that frequent debates take 
place not only in the Federal Parliament 
but in State Parliaments and Territory 
legislative bodies.
* periodical review o f policies by a body 
independent o f government and with 
adequate access to the public
* the establishment o f the machinery for 
the development of regular review o f a 
national energy policy
* immediate steps to institute full and 
energetic programs o f research and 
development into alternative energy 
sources
* a n a t io n a l  p ro g ra m  o f  e n e rg y  
conservation
* ample time for public consideration of 
the Report and debate upon it.
This last recommendation is, in fact, at the 
heart o f the whole issue. For it emphasises 
the need to reach a decision that is in full 
accord with the democratic process. For this 
purpose, the ordinary people must be made 
aware o f the relevant facts .But there is much 
more to it than that. To be in command of the 
facts is one thing, to arrive at a considered 
and responsible judgment in relation to the 
facts is quite another. It is highly significant 
that after one year o f solid deliberation, the 
C o m m is s io n ,  c o m p o s e d  o f  th r e e  
distinguished men and assisted by several 
experts and advisers, was not able to 
determine “ whether it is preferable to delay 
coming to a decision about mining for a 
period of several years or alternatively to 
proceed with carefully planned development 
o f the industry” (p.181). Given the gravity, 
the complexity and the unforeseeable 
consequences of the nuclear project, itison ly  
prudence and common sense to insist that 
any decision should be preceded by the 
widest public and parliamentary debate. The 
responsibility is too large to be entrusted to 
interested parties in the nuclear industry, to 
the experts or to the government. What is at 
stake is not only the future o f this generation 
but that o f countless generations yet unborn.
